DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-DUE

PROCESS-SEQUESTRATION

OF

PROPERTY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING TO DEBTOR
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Mitchell v.

W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
Lawrence Mitchell had purchased several major household
appliances on an installment sales contract from the W. T. Grant
Company. When Mitchell defaulted in his payments, Grant
brought suit in the First City Court of New Orleans, alleging an
unpaid balance overdue on the purchase price of the items and
asking judgment in that amount. Mitchell was served in due course
with notice of the action, directing him to plead or make appearance in the case.1
At the time of filing its complaint, Grant additionally alleged a
vendor's lien on the merchandise 2 and petitioned that a writ of
sequestration issue, directing that the property be seized and
placed in the custody of the court to assure its preservation and
availability pending final judgment. 3 By affidavit, Grant's credit
manager affirmed the facts of the complaint and asserted that the
company had reason to fear Mitchell would encumber or alienate
the goods while the main proceedings were pending. 4 On the basis
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897 (1974).
2

Id. Although the United States Supreme Court utilizes the term "vendor's lien," it

should be noted that the Louisiana law which enables a vendor to look to the goods sold in
order to satisfy the debt thereon is instead denominated a "vendor's privilege." This
privilege differs from the common law vendor's lien in that the lien is lost when the vendee
takes possession of the article sold, while the privilege is enforceable as long as the vendee
has possession. See Comment, Vendor's Privilege, 4 TULANE L. REv. 239, 243 & n.15 (1929).
The privilege is also distinguishable from a vendor's lien as defined by Louisiana civil law
which, like the common law lien, also. attaches only to goods in the vendor's possession. Id. at
243.
A similarity appears to exist, however, between the vendor's privilege under Louisiana
civil law and a vendor's rights in the collateral under a statutory purchase money security
agreement. Compare LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-107 & Comment 1 (1972 version). For a general discussion comparing the law of
secured transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code to Louisiana law see Sachse,
Report to the LouisianaLaw Institute on Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code (pts. 1-2), 41
TULANE L. REv. 505, 785 (1967).
For clarity and consistency this Note will apply the Supreme Court's terminology and
will utilize "vendor's lien" to denote "vendor's privilege" under Louisiana law.
' Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897 (1974). Sequestration is the
procedural machinery by which the vendor's lien is protected and enforced. W. T. Grant Co.
v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 638, 269 So. 2d 186, 190 (1972). See generally Johnson, Attachment
and Sequestration: ProvisionalRemedies Under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 38 TULANE L.
REv. 1 (1963).
" Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897 (1974). The procedure for issuing
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of the petition and affidavit, the presiding judge ordered that the
writ issue upon Grant furnishing a bond in a specified amount.5
This done, the writ of sequestration issued immediately, and the
6
sheriff executed it by confiscating the appliances from Mitchell.
Subsequent to his dispossession, Mitchell moved to dissolve the
sequestration writ. Stipulating that a vendor's lien in Grant's favor
existed on the items, Mitchell nevertheless contended that by permitting the writ to issue ex parte and by allowing the seizure of his
property without prior notice or hearing, the sequestration statutes
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
The trial court denied the motion, an appellate court refused
review,' and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed, specifically
rejecting Mitchell's due process challenge. 9
On certiorari"0 the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding, in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., that "the Louisiana sequestration procedure [was] not invalid, either on its face or as
applied."" The issue, as the Court perceived it, was whether due
writs of sequestration is governed by LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961), which
provides in pertinent part:
A writ of . . . sequestration shall issue only when the nature of the claim and
the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ
clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by, or by the
separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel or agent.
The grounds for sequestration are set forth in LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West
1961) which provides:
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a
mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under a writ
of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or
waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the
parish, during the pendency of the action.
I Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897 (1974). A bond to protect the
vendee's interest is required by LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961), which
mandates that
[t]he applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the payment of the
damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrongfully.
6 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897 (1974). The sheriff's right of entry
and the provisions controlling the execution of the writ are specified in LA. CODE CIv. PRO.
ANN. arts. 325 (West 1960), 3504 (West 1961) respectively.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1897-98 (1974).
See W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 632, 269 So. 2d 186, 187 (1972).
Id. at 639-42, 269 So. 2d at 190-91. The court, quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
93 (1972), suggested that no hearing prior to seizure was necessary where " 'a creditor could
make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods.' "
263 La. at 640, 269 So. 2d at 190. The court decided that the creditor had made such a
showing in the case at hand. Id.
Additionally, the court reasoned that Mitchell's very act of buying created an irrefutable
inference that he had consented to preservation of the vendor's lien and its attendant right
to sequestration. Id. at 640-42, 269 So. 2d at 190-91.
10411 U.S. 981 (1973).
1194 S. Ct. 1895, 1899 (1974).
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process demanded a hearing on the matter of possession betore
the disputed property could be taken. 12 In this respect, the Court
emphasized at the outset that this was not a case where the sequestered goods belonged exclusively to the vendee-debtor.1 3 By state
law the vendor-creditor also had a property right in the same
goods,' 4 and therefore resolution of the due process question had
15
to take into account the interests of buyer and seller alike.
The Court began its analysis of these interests with the observation that Grant, with its vendor's lien to secure payment of the
purchase price, had the right either to be paid according to the
contract or to have possession of the goods in order to foreclose its
lien and recover the unpaid balance of the debt.16 It was desirable
for Grant to repossess immediately for two reasons. First, once
payments had ceased, Mitchell's continued use of the merchandise
would have irreversibly eroded Grant's interest in the property as
security. 7 Second, there was the continuing danger that Mitchell
would transfer possession of the appliances, thereby extinguishing
Grant's lien under state law."'
Acknowledging that under these circumstances Louisiana was
entitled to protect the creditor-vendor, the Court recounted the
steps of the procedure. Grant had produced documents and had
sworn to facts which under the sales contract would have entitled
12

Id. at 1900.

13 Id. at 1898. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 2373 (West 1961) dictates the procedure for

disposing of the proceeds following a foreclosure sale:
After deducting the costs, the sheriff shall first pay the amount due the seizing
creditor, then the inferior mortgages, liens, and privileges on the property sold,
and shall pay to the debtor whatever surplus may remain.
Mitchell's interest in the property was therefore no greater than the potential surplus. 94 S.
Ct. at 1898.
'4 Grant's interest was equal to the amount of the debt outstanding. 94 S. Ct. at 1898.
" Id. This perception of the concept of due process appears to stand in sharp contrast
to the view expressed by the Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972),
wherein it was stated that
[p]rocedural due process is not intended to ... accommodate all possible interests:
it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are
about to be taken.
16 94 S. Ct. at 1900.
17 Id. The Court explains that an installment seller can fairly anticipate that the goods
in the hands of the buyer will depreciate in resale value over any given period of time, but
that "he is normally protected because the buyer's installment payments keep pace with the
deterioration in value of the security." Id. Cessation of payments therefore jeopardizes the
seller's protection from value depreciation.
s Id. at 1901. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952) reads in pertinent part:
He who has sold to another any movable property which is not paid for, has a
preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the purchaser,
whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the property still remains in the
possession of the purchaser.
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the company to immediate possession of the goods.1 9 The factual
demonstration in this case had been made to a judge,2 0 and security had been furnished in an amount sufficient to insure that
Mitchell would have been reimbursed for any damages or expenses
had the sequestration later proven unjustified.2"
As for Mitchell, the Court noted that a full and immediate
post-seizure hearing on possession had been available to him 2 2 as
well as a procedure for securing release of the goods by posting his
own counterbond.23 Mitchell had posted no such bond to protect
Grant's security in the event Mitchell's interim possession was held
to be wrongful at a later adjudication.2 4 The Court therefore determined that the jeopardy to Grant's interest in the goods outweighed any hardship to Mitchell occasioned by the temporary loss
of his household items.

25

"9 94 S. Ct. at 1900.
'0 Id. at 1897. Under Louisiana law writs of sequestration generally can be issued by
court clerks. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. arts. 282, 283 (West 1960). Under the provision of LA.

CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 281 (West 1960), however, the authority to issue writs of sequestraton in the parish of Orleans is restricted to a judge, and it was in this jurisdiction that Grant
brought its action. 94 S. Ct. at 1899 & n.5.
21 94 S. Ct. at 1899 & n.6. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961) provides in

pertinent part:
The court may allow damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of . . .
sequestration on a motion to dissolve, or on a reconventional demand. Attorney's
fees for the services rendered in connection with the dissolution of the writ may be
included as an element of damages whether the writ is dissolved on motion or after
trial on the merits.
22 94 S. Ct. at 1901. The prc.visions for a post-seizure inquiry are set forth in LA. CODE
Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961), which reads in relevant part:
The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of
...
sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was
issued. If the writ of... sequestration is dissolved, the action shall then proceed as
if no writ had been issued.
Although the language of this article would appear to permit a vendee-debtor to move
to dissolve the writ at any time after its issuance, this provision must be read in conjunction
with LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501 (West 1961) and 321 (West 1960), which together
contemplate immediate execution of the writ by the sheriff. See note 4 supra. It appears then
that article 3506 would in practice come into play only after seizure has been effected.
23 94 S. Ct. at 1900. Under LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3507 (West 1961), the amount
of security required of the vendee must be sufficient to satisfy any potential adverse
judgment.
24 94 S. Ct. at 1900.

IId. at 1901. The Court injected the observation at this point that Mitchell's basic
source of income was unaffected by the temporary deprivation of his household appliances.
Id. This comment might be construed merely as a makeweight for the decision or as an
attempt to reconcile the holding in Mitchell with the Court's prior opinion in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), in which it was held that a prejudgment
garnishment of wages could not constitutionally be carried out without prior notice or
hearing. See notes 45-57 infra and accompanying text. In another context this remark might
be interpreted as a suggestion that in cases involving property which is directly used in the
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Reviewing and summarizing the salient features of the
Louisiana sequestration scheme, the Court found that the system
itself tended to minimize the risk of a wrongful repossession.2 6
According to the Court's analysis, the hardship to the debtor was
restricted; the seller had a substantial interest; the proceedings
were supervised judicially, and the successful party was insulated
from any loss.2 7 Therefore, it was the opinion of the Court that,
notwithstanding the absence of prior notice and a hearing, the
sequestration procedure "effect[ed] a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests" of buyer and seller 28 and worked
no denial of procedural due process to the debtor.2 9
Mitchell was not the first case in which a summary taking of
property came under due process attack before the Supreme
Court. In several previous instances the Court had upheld the outright seizure of goods without prior notice or hearing, on the theory cogently expressed by Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court
in Phillips v. Commissioner,30 that
[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the
opportunity given for
the ultimate judicial determination of the
31
liability is adequate.
Illustrative of this principle is Ewing v. Mytinger &
Inc. 32 The Ewing Court was confronted with a challenge
which permitted seizure of misbranded articles in
where an administrative official had reason to believe,
found without a hearing, that such products would be
or misleading to the public. 3

3

Casselberry,
to a statute
commerce,
from facts
dangerous

A distributor, whose allegedly mis-

labeled vitamins had been so seized, protested that this was a taking
of property without due process of law. 34 The Court, however,
pursuit of a livelihood, due process requirements would be more stringent. See note 98 infra
and accompanying text.
26 94 S. Ct. at 1905.
27 Id. at 1906.
28 Id. at 1900.
29 Id. at 1906.
30 283 U.S. 589 (1931). The Court disposed of the challenge to a procedure allowing
for the summary assessment of delinquent taxes against a stockholder of a dissolved corporation on the basis of the earlier cases of Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880), and
Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905). 283 U.S. at 597.
31 283 U.S. at 596-97.
32 339 U.S. 594 (1950). See also North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908).
33 339 U.S. at 595-96.
31 Id. at 596-98. It was also urged that the seizures might have caused irreparable
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sustained the ex parte procedure, stating that for due process
purposes it was sufficient that at some point the opportunity for
35
judicial determination was provided.
Similarly, the Court in Ownbey v. Morgan3 6 had upheld a prejudgment attachment of property effected by a creditor without
prior notice or hearing to the debtor.3 7 Seven years later in Coffin
Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 38 the Court reaffirmed this position,
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, observing that
nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment
a lien
39
dependent for its effect upon the result of the suit.

In McKay v. Mclnnes,4 ° the Court was called upon to review a
Maine statute which permitted a nonresident creditor, suing in a
Maine court, to summarily attach the property of a state resident in
damage to the distributor's business. Id. at 599. Acknowledging that this could indeed
happen, the Court nevertheless responded:
The impact of the initiation ofjudicial proceedings is often serious. Take the case
of the grand jury. It returns an indictment against a man without a hearing. It does
not determine his guilt; it only determines whether there is probable cause to
believe he is guilty. But that determination is conclusive on the issue of probable
cause.... The harm to property and business can also be incalculable by the mere
institution of proceedings. Yet it has never been held that the hand of government
must be stayed until the courts have an opportunity to determine whether the
government is justified in instituting suit in the courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 599.
36 256 U.S. 94 (1921).

31 Id. at 111. Ownbey involved a challenge to a Delaware statute which provided that a
nonresident, whose property within the state had been attached in the initiation of a quasi in
rem proceeding, would be denied the right to appear and defend unless he first posted
security equal to the value of the property attached. Id. at 98-100. The Court stated:
A procedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution, in the commercial
metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the States as suited to their
circumstances and needs, cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law,
even if it be taken with its ancient incident of requiring security from a defendant
who after seizure of his property comes within the jurisdiction and seeks to interpose a defense.
Id. at 111. For a discussion of this case see Black, Ownbey v. Morgan-A JudicialMilepost on the
Road to Absolutism, 23 Ky. L.J. 69 (1934). See generally Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REv. 303 (1962); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300 (1970).
38 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
" Id. at 31. At issue in Coffin was a Georgia statute which permitted the Superintendent
of Banks to summarily attach all property belonging to stockholders of a defunct bank,
where the stockholders had neglected to pay an assessment. Id. at 30. The Court sustained
the procedure, stating:
The fact that the execution is issued in the first instance by an agent of the State but
not from a Court, followed as it is by personal notice and a right to take the case
into court, is a familiar method in Georgia and is open to no objection.
Id. at 31.
-0 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
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advance of judgment. 41 In sustaining the constitutionality of the
procedure, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had reasoned
that because attachment was conditional, temporary and part of
the legal remedy by which a debtor's property is taken to satisfy a
judgment, it was not the "deprivation of property" envisioned by
the United States Constitution. 42 Even if it were, the court continued, it would not be a deprivation "without due process of law"
because the procedure provided notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before final disposition of the property.43 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision without opinion,
44
merely citing Ownbey and Coffin as determinative.
The first case to question these principles was Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.45 At issue in Sniadach was a Wisconsin garnishment statute 46 which permitted a creditor, suing on a promissory note, to "freeze" by court directive one-half the wages due an
employee, 4 7 so that the money would be available to satisfy a
potential judgment. 4 The procedure was available on the
creditor's ex parte application, and the garnishment took place
without either prior notice to the wage earner or the opportunity
49

to be heard.
41

Since the Court rendered a per curiam decision, the underlying facts of this case

must be gleaned from the state court decision. Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 112-13, 141
A. 699, 701 (1928).
42 Id. at 116, 141 A. at 702.
43 Id., 141 A. at 702-03.
44 279 U.S. at 820.
45 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For an overview of Sniadach see Comment, The Constitutional
Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 837
(1970); Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1970); Note, Garnishment
of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implicationsfor
Related Areas of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 986 (1970); Note, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.-The Death Knell of Prejudgment Wage Garnishment, 16 N.Y.L.F. 263 (1970).
46 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 267.01 etseq. (1965). Garnishment denotes a statutory proceeding
by which a debt owed by a third person to the defendant is made subject to the plaintiffs
claims. "Garnishment," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (4th rev. ed. 1968). For due process
purposes, this procedure has been deemed analogous to the attachment of tangible property
and is governed by the same legal principles. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); cf
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877). See generally Beale, The Exercise of JurisdictionIn
Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1913); Carpenter, Jurisdiction over
Debtsfor the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1918);
Riesenfeld, Creditors' Remedies and the Conflict of Laws-Part One: Individual Collection of Claims,
60 COLUM. L. REV. 659 (1960).
It should be noted that at present federal legislation regulates and restricts the percentage of wages available for garnishment. 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. (1970).
41 395 U.S. at 337-39.
41 See note 46 supra.
49 395 U.S. at 338-39. In practice the attorney for the plaintiff would obtain a summons
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The Supreme Court stated that such summary procedure
might meet the demands of due process in exceptional situations
necessitating special protection of a state or creditor interest.5 0
However, no such situation was perceived in the facts of the case.
Moreover, the Wisconsin statute was not narrowly drawn to accommodate this type of unusual circumstance. 51 Acknowledging
McKay, the Court reasoned that a rule which might comport with
procedural due process for attachments generally would not necessarily do so in every case, nor protect all types of property in
52
contemporary society.
The Court emphasized that it was dealing with wage garnishment, a procedure particularly susceptible to abuse by creditors
with questionable claims who would have tremendous leverage in
any settlement negotiations with a debtor whose family had been
"driven to the wall" by the immobilization of his wages. 53 Therefore, in spite of the long history of the remedy, 4 prejudgment
from a court clerk. The attorney would then personally serve the garnishee (employer) and
the defendant respectively. Id.
50 Id. at 339. The Sniadach Court cited Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947)
(summary appointment of conservator for bank accused of unlawful and injurious practices), Ewing, Ownbey, and Coffin as examples of cases where extraordinary situations justified
the summary action taken. 395 U.S. at 339. See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
51 395 U.S. at 339. The Court noted that in personam jurisdiction could easily have
been obtained over the wage earner, who resided in Wisconsin. Id.
51 Id. at 340.
53 Id. at 340-42. This danger was well illustrated by the Court:
"The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is
usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. If
the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and
collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will often
sign a new contract of 'payment schedule' which incorporates these additional
charges."
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted) (quoting Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical
Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 753 (1968)). Further, the Court found "the statutory exemption granted the wage earner is 'generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one
week.' " 395 U.S. at 341 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection
Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759, 767).
The Court appeared to be satisfied that the mere potential for such untoward consequences rendered the procedure unconstitutional, for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
sustaining the statute specifically found neither abuse of the process, nor undue hardship
worked upon the defendant in the case. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163,
166-68, 174, 154 N.W.2d 259, 261-62, 265 (1967).
'4 This argument was dismissed peremptorily: "The fact that a procedure would pass
muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection... 395 U.S. at
340. But see id. at 349 (Black, J., dissenting), where the Justice quotes Justice Holmes in
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922):
"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly alike.
If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . ."
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garnishment of the Wisconsin type, which made no provision for
prior notice and a hearing, was held to violate basic principles of
due process.5
The concurring opinion made it clear that the "property" of
which the wage earner was deprived was the use of the frozen
portion of the fund during the interval between garnishment and
the conclusion of the main suit. 5 6 Since this deprivation was seen as

more than de minimis, it was asserted that due process requires
notice and hearing designed to establish at least the probable merit
of the primary claim against the debtor before any taking
of prop57
erty or interference with property rights could occur.
Sniadach clearly sounded the tocsin for a variety of summary
creditor remedies which were available ex parte and which failed to
afford debtors prior notice or a hearing. 5 8 But it was unclear how
far the rationale of Sniadach was to be carried, for the case dealt
with property that was both special and necessary, and in which the
55 395 U.S. at 342.

56 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 342-43.
Following Sniadach such remedies were subjected to due process challenges throughout the country, with differing results. Many courts read the case as a broad attack on the
constitutionality of all summary remedies and consequently struck down similar ex parte
procedures. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (summary seizure of
portable television in enforcement of landlord's lien); Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp.
741 (D. Mass. 1972) (summary garnishment by trustee process procedure); Adams v. Egley,
338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank,
492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974)'nonjudicial
repossession); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distress sale of tenant's
goods by landlord); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
(prejudgment statutory replevin); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(innkeeper's lien enforceable by summary seizure); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (prejudgment
attachment of bank account); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971) (prejudgment claim and delivery); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286
Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (prejudgment garnishment of accounts receivable); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of
commercial bank account).
Other courts interpreted Sniadach to be narrowly confined to its facts and upheld
related summary procedures where the property at issue was other than wages. See, e.g.,
Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. -denied, 409 U.S. 843
(1972) (foreign attachment); Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970)
(statutory replevin); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971)
(attachment of real estate); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D.
Hawaii 1970) (garnishment of bank accounts and accounts receivable); Young v. Ridley, 309
F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (mortgage foreclosure); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105
Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969) (attachment and garnishment of property other than wages);
300 W. 1'54th St. Realty Co. v. Department of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311
N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970) (administrative procedure authorizing use of tenants' rent to abate
nuisance without notice or hearing to landlord).
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suing creditor had no previous interest. 5 9 In particular, Sniadach
did not purport to be controlling in the typical case where an
installment seller instituted an action for an unpaid balance and
sought to repossess the sold merchandise on which a lien to secure
payment had been retained. Such a case came before the Supreme
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 60 the holding of which was the "main6
stay" of the debtor's due process attack in.Mitchell. 1
The appellants in Fuentes were purchasers on conditional sales
contracts,6 2 whose goods had been repossessed by their creditors
upon default of payment, pursuant to the replevin laws of Florida
and Pennsylvania. 63 Both statutes allowed for the ex parte seizure
of property, without prior notice or hearing, upon the creditor
furnishing security keyed to the value of the items repossessed.6 4
The seizures were to be effected by state officials,6 5 and the debtors
were permitted to secure release of the goods by posting their own
bond.

66

While a creditor could, under the Florida statute, obtain the
replevin writ from a court clerk by merely asserting in the com59 In this respect subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the notice and hearing
requirements of procedural due process seem to provide scant additional guidance in the
context of summary repossession by private creditors. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), the Court held that welfare benefits could not be terminated without first affording

the recipient a full evidentiary hearing concerning eligibility. Id. at 270-71. In Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (197 l),.it was held that the exclusion of questions of liability in connection with
a car accident rendered a hearing prior to suspension of an uninsured motorist's license
violative of due process. Id. at 542-43. Thus, in both cases it was a governmental interest
competing against a private one, with the property at issue being a statutory entitlement. See
also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971).
60 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For general discussions of this case see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v.
Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REv. 955
(1972); Gardner, Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditorand Replevin, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 17
(1972); Note, Right to Hearing Before Taking of Property, 86 HARV. L. REV. 85 (1972).
61 94 S. Ct. at 1904.
62 407 U.S. at 70-71. This was not true of appellant Rosa Washington, whose child's

clothes, furniture, and toys had been repossessed on a writ of replevin obtained by her
ex-husband, a deputy sheriff who was familiar with the procedure. Id. at 72.
63 Id. at 70-72. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 et seq. (1967), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
78.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1073(a) et seq. (1967).
64 407 U.S. at 69-70, 73 n.6, 75 n.7.
65 Id. at 69. The argument that such provisions authorize "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and so violate the fourth amendment is discussed in Comment, Laprease and
Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 898-901 (1971). The fourth amendment issue was raised by appellants in Fuentes, but not decided by the Court. Compare 407
U.S. at 71 n.2 with id. at 96 n.32.
" 407 U.S. at 75, 78. For a discussion of how such provisions may violate the equal
protection dause by discriminating against persons of low income see Comment, supra note
65, at 901-03.
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plaint his entitlement to the property, the requisite filing of the
complaint assured an ultimate post-seizure adjudication of the
issues. 6 7 To obtain the writ in Pennsylvania, however, a creditor
-had only to file an affidavit as to the value of the property in
dispute. There was no requirement that a complaint be made;
thus, unless the dispossessed debtor initiated an action, there might
68
never have been a hearing on the merits.
The Court found that the right to be heard was basic to a
process that acted to confiscate a person's possessions. 69 To have
full effect in preventing unfair or mistaken deprivations, the notice
and hearing had to be supplied before any property was taken,7°
especially where the procedural safeguards already provided to the
debtors appeared insufficient to deter or weed out unjustified
claims for repossession. 7 1
Earlier cases permitting postponements of a hearing were distinguished as "extraordinary situations" involving a substantial
governmental or general public interest, 72 and the mere "private
gain" directly at issue in the normal creditor-debtor circumstance
407 U.S. at 74-75.
" Id. at 75-78. Compare the procedures prescribed by the Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes to the procedure authorized by the Louisiana sequestration law. See notes
19-23 supra and accompanying text.
"' 407 U.S. at 80. The Court had earlier disposed of an historical argument advanced
on behalf of replevin by pointing out that the modern statutory replevin procedures under
consideration bore little actual resemblance to their common law ancestor. Id. at 78-80 &
n.'10. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
Although functionally similar to statutory replevin, the sequestration scheme at issue in
Mitchell was not at all a product of the common law, having its roots instead in the law of
Rome, as it was later developed in France and Spain. Millar, Judicial Sequestration in
Louisiana: Some Account of its Sources, 30 TuLANE L. Rav. 201, 227 (1956).
70 407 U.S. at 81. The Court observed that
[a]t a later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned to him if they were
unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded to
him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can
undo the fact that the arbitrary taking . . . has already occurred.
Id. at 81-82.
71 Id. at 83-84.
7 Id. at 90-92. The cases were further distinguished on the basis of a need for
expeditious action and the fact that each involved a governmental official who operated
under a restrictively drawn statute. Id. at 91.
Echoing Sniadach, the Court distinguished the seizure cases, including Ewing, and the
attachment cases Ownbey and Coffin, on the basis of some overriding governmental or public
interest it found to be present in each. McKay defied similar characterization, but the Fuentes
Court asserted that the unexplained per curiam decision could stand for no more than was
established by Ownbey and Coffin, upon which McKay relied completely. Id. at 90-92 &
nn.22-28; see note 50 supra and accompanying text.
The Mitchell Court did not appear to perceive any such distinction, finding McKay to
state the general rule and Sniadach the exception. 94 S. Ct. at 1902-04.
67
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was deemed insufficient to justify delay. 73 Having found that a
non-final seizure was nonetheless a "deprivation" 74 and that a possessory interest in ordinary household goods was "property" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 75 the Court rejected a
purported contractual waiver of due process rights as not
sufficiently clear 76 and held that in the context of these cases a
state, acting on behalf of a creditor, could constitutionally seize
property pending final judgment only when a creditor had tested
'77
his claim at a "fair prior hearing.
The dissent criticized the Fuentes majority for failing to consider fully the creditor's interest in the property repossessed, an
"interest as deserving of protection as that of the debtor.

' 78

The

Court's prior hearing rule was characterized as mere "ideological
tinkering with state law" 79 because creditors appeared'able to circumvent the mandate by use of a more artfully drawn waiver
provision ° or by resort to self-help repossession.8 1 Alternatively, it
73 407 U.S. at 92. It was asserted that
[t]he replevin of chattels, as in the present cases, may satisfy a debt or settle a score.
But state intervention in a private dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war effort or protecting the public health.
Id. at 92-93.
The concurrence in Mitchell suggested that there was an interest in summary repossession greater than that of the creditor alone, namely a governmental interest in providing "a
reasonable and fair framework of rules which facilitate commercial transactions on a credit
basis." 94 S. Ct. at 1908 (Powell, J., concurring).
74 407 U.S. at 84-85. See text accompanying note 56 supra. The Court found that the
provisions permitting the debtors to recover their goods by posting a bond merely exchanged one deprivation for another. 407 U.S. at 85.
75 407 U.S. at 86-87, 89-90. It should be emphasized that this involved two distinct
findings: (1) the Constitution protects more than absolute ownership and (2) "property"
means any property and not merely a necessity. Id.
71 Id. at 95. The contracts provided that upon default the seller could "take back,"
"retake," or "repossess" the merchandise; no waiver of a prior hearing was specified. Id. at
95-96. The Court distinguished the cognovit clause upheld in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), where the waiver of due process rights was clear, understood, and
bargained for by commercial parties of equal strength. 407 U.S. at 95. For a discussion of
cognovit clauses see Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1961).
77 407 U.S. at 96.
78 Id. at 102 (White, J., dissenting). Some clue as to the importance of this protection is
supplied by UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501, Comment 1 (1972 version), which reads in

part:
The rights of the secured party in the collateral after the debtor's default are of
the essence of a security transaction. These are the rights which distinguish the secured
from the unsecured lender.
(Emphasis added).
79 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. That this could in fact be done was not altogether as dear as the Justice had
implied. While D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), sustained a cognovit
clause between merchants, the Court there had observed that
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was asserted that creditors could prevail at prior hearings merely
by establishing probable cause for claiming default, and therefore
that the hearings would provide little extra protection for debtors,
while such a requirement could possibly render credit more expen2
sive or less readily available.
Against this background, Mitchell substantially modifies and
limits the holding of Fuentes. The teaching of Mitchell is that the
absence of prior notice and hearing is not the talisman, but merely
a factor to be considered along with other procedural elements in
determining whether a state-effected taking of property is
constitutional.8 3 The Mitchell Court significantly adjudged that
when the procedure is fair in other respects, the interest of a
private creditor in summary repossession will outweigh the debtor's
interest in having his possession undisturbed until afforded notice
84
and a hearing.
Mitchell thus demonstrates that, at least in the secured
creditor-debtor context, the broad ex parte remedy still has vitality,
and so much of Fuentes as established a "Procrustean rule of a prior
adversary hearing" has been clearly rescinded.8 5 That rule will
where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining
power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the [waiver] provision, other legal
consequences may ensue.
Id. at 188. Since installment sales contracts are almost always adhesive in nature, it had been
suggested that the issues raised by any purported waiver would have themselves necessitated
a prior hearing. Note, The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L.
REv. 41, 59-60 (1973); cf. Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). See generally
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.REv. 629
(1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts (pts. 1-2), 35 TEM1'LE L.Q. 125, 281
(1962); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV.
L. Rav. 529 (1971).
" 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting). Nonjudicial repossession is not only a contractual remedy, as the Justice here suggested, but is authorized by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-503 (1972 version), which reads in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
For decisions holding that this and other private creditor remedies are outside the purview
of the fourteenth amendment owing to the absence of "state action" see note 99 infra.
82 407 U.S. at 102-03 (White, J., dissenting). A similar argument was made by Justice
Black in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970), where the Justice in his dissent
suggested that the increased burden placed upon the welfare agencies by the Court's
requiring full pretermination hearings would ultimately result in longer investigations of
eligibility, to the detriment of potential recipients.
83 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
84 Id. This view differs markedly from the position taken by the Court in Fuentes. See
note 15 supra,

85 94 S. Ct. at 1908, 1910 (Powell, J., concurring).
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presumably give way to the kind of flexible interest-balancing that
86
was characteristic of due process considerations in the past.
The Court in Mitchell was ultimately able to distinguish Fuentes
because the statutes under consideration in the latter case were
deficient not only in their failure to provide pre-seizure notice and
a hearing but also in other respects. Those "arbitrary and unreasonable provisions" 's7 stood in sharp contrast to the Louisiana
sequestration procedure, which was available to claimants on narrowly defined grounds particularly amenable to ex parte documentary proof and which provided for judicial supervision
throughout. 8 8 The Court reasoned that in such a case, i.e., where
the ex parte process itself tended to minimize the risk of a wrongful repossession, the efficacy of an adversary hearing on possession
would be diminished, and in this case a hearing was available in
any event immediately after seizure.8 9
The Mitchell dissent, however, was less than persuaded by
these arguments, finding the case "constitutionally indistinguishable" from Fuentes and representing no more than the triumph of
the analysis in the Fuentes dissent, made possible by a change in
membership on the Court. 90 It was asserted that the procedural
differences between the Louisiana sequestration scheme and the
replevin statutes at issue in Fuentes were matters of form rather
than substance, insufficient to justify the result in Mitchell.9 ' For the
8

See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1974) (governmental interest in

controlling its labor force balanced against federal worker's interest in continued employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970) (governmental interest in conserving
fiscal resources balanced against consequences to eligible recipient of wrongful welfare
termination); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961) (security
of military base balanced against civilian employee's right to further employment); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 173 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (national security interest balanced against injuries caused to individuals by summary
inclusion on subversive list).
87 94 S. Ct. at 1908 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 1904-05.
89 Id.
at 1905. The Court distinguished the repossessions in Fuentes as having been
premised on wrongful detention, a "broad 'fault' standard ...
inherently subject to factual
determination and adversarial input." Id.
90 Id. at 1913-14 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Although Justices Powell and Rehnquist were
members of the Court when Fuentes was decided, they had not been members when the case
was argued and therefore took no part in its consideration or decision. These Justices
combined with the dissent in Fuentes to constitute the majority in Mitchell. Compare id.at 1895
uith 407 U.S. at 97.
91 94 S. Ct. at 1912-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the factual
showing required for issuance of the writ meant ittle more than providing enough information on the appropriate documents so that a judge could find them formally sufficient, thus
rendering the subsequent issuance of the writ a mere ministerial act. These procedural
safeguards were found to be no replacement for a prior hearing. Id. at 1912.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 150

dissent, the absence of prior notice and hearing were still at the
heart of the case and were constitutional necessities for the reasons
92

advanced in Fuentes.

Following Mitchell, it would appear that due process challenges
of a summary ex parte remedy will have to be directed against the
procedure in its entirety. Mitchell indicates that such elements as
the grounds for obtaining the remedy, 93 the type of showing
required, 94 judicial presence9 5 and the celerity with which a seizure
may be challenged by the debtor after it has been effected, 96 all
influence the determination of constitutionality, though none alone
would appear to be decisive. 97 Also to be considered are the degree
of hardship worked upon the debtor and the nature of the property seized. 98 As. to the relative weights to be accorded each, the
Court provides only general guidance, and a largely case-by-case
consideration is invited, with the sequestration procedure in Mitchell and the replevin statutes in Fuentes standing as examples of
what will and will not pass constitutional muster.
Viewed in perspective, Mitchell appears both fair and practical,
especially while self-help repossession still looms as a viable alternative to creditors in most jurisdictions. 99 Still, one aspect of the case
92 Id. at 1911-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting). So important was this prior hearing issue that,
even though the majority had taken pains to distinguish the earlier case, the dissent
maintained that Mitchell had "unmistakably overruled" Fuentes. Id. at 1913.
93 Id. at 1905.
94 Id. at 1904.
15 Id. at 1904-05. The majority in Mitchell asserted that the case would not abruptly turn
the tide of post-Fuentes cases because in most of those cases judicial supervision was not
absolutely required, thereby implying that they were distinguishable from Mitchell on that
ground. Id. at 1906 n.14. See, e.g., Turner v. Colonial Finance Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.
1972); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 919
(1973). But see Inter City Motor Sales v. Judge of the Common Pleas Court, 42 Mich. App.
112, 201 N.W.2d 378 (1972).
:6 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
1 See Guzman v. Western State Bank, 43 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.D. Sept. 25, 1974).
t 94 S. Ct. at 1901. Due process considerations may change where the property sought
to be repossessed is not, for example, a television set, but instead, the tools of one's trade or
an artificial kidney machine. See note 25 supra. From the creditor's point of view, however,
the fact that the particular collateral is an item of necessity for the debtor should bear no
relevancy to the creditor's right of action on default.
99 Self-help repossession pursuant to section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code
has been held not to involve the "state action" necessary to invoke the protections of the
fourteenth amendment at all. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974)
(repossession of automobile); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974)
(repossession and resale of automobile); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974)
(repossession of automobile); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (repossession of automobile); Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov.
11, 1974) (repossession of automobiles). Other private creditor remedies have been upheld
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may require further clarification. In broadest terms the Mitchell
Court has announced that due process is not violated by postponing a hearing on the issues in the possessory action until after
seizure.1 0 0 But precisely what are these issues? Specifically, the
crucial question yet to be answered is whether a creditor, assuming
the debt and lien were valid, could always prevail by proving no
more than a missed payment, even where the debtor asserts some
defense for the delinquency.1 0 1
An affirmative answer would be consistent with the view expressed in the Fuentes dissent,10 2 but then the Mitchell Court's
emphasis on judicial presence would seem misplaced, since the
hearing would practically be an empty formality. Such a stance
would also be distinctly anti-consumer, for the buyer may have
refused to pay for some specific reason related to a defect in the
goods or to misrepresentation on the part of the seller.' 0 3 Indeed,
on a like rationale. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927
(ist Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (bank's set-off of depositors'
accounts); Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct.
15, 1974) (filing of wage assignment with debtor's employer); Bichel Optical Laboratories,
Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973) (bank's seizure of borrower's
funds and accounts receivable). See generally Symposium-Creditors' Rights, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1973); Note, Se6f-Help Repossession: The ConstitutionalAttack, the Legislative Response, and the
Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J. 273 (1973).
100 The Court variously defined these issues as: (1) "default, the existence of a lien and
possession of the debtor"; (2) "the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency"; (3)
"the existence of a vendor's lien and the issue of default." 94 S. Ct. at 1900, 1901, 1905.
101 This was the case in Fuentes, where appellant Margarita Fuentes had ceased payments because of a dispute with her creditor over the servicing of a purchased stove. 407
U.S. at 70. She argued that Florida law allowed her to defend on grounds that the creditor
breached the sales contract. Id. at 87 n.17. See Abbott & Peters, supra note 60, at 966 n.36.
Because of the ultimate disposition of the case, the Court found it unnecessary to consider
the issue. 407 U.S. at 87 n.17.
The Uniform Commercial Code is intended theoretically to provide some recourse for
purchasers. See generally Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1465 (1967). However, standard sales contracts
are usually set up so that any missed payment will trigger the default provision, regardless of
the reason for the delinquency. For an excellent discussion of how article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in practice works for the creditor and against the consumer in these
respects see Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld
and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302 (1972).
1 2 It was asserted that even if a hearing were necessary, creditors would only have to
establish "probable cause" for claiming default. 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
Presumably this meant showing no more than that the debtor was in arrears. See id. at 101
n.*.
The Fuentes majority had announced that it was "axiomatic that the hearing must
provide a real test," but they neglected to explain what the subject of the test would be. Id. at
97.
103 A recent study of consumer defaults indicates that more than one fourth of the
buyers claim such a reason for ceasing payments, most often fraud or misrepresentations
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withholding payments may be the only leverage a consumer-debtor
has, and this may be done almost as a visceral retaliation, especially.
by low-income consumers who might have little conception of the
legal consequences which may ensue.' 0 4 Perhaps in such a case due
process would be provided only by a hearing, even after seizure, on
all pertinent issues actionable under the substantive law of the
state.1

05

But this approach also leads to problems. If all issues could be
raised at a post-seizure hearing, what would distinguish the hearing from the main trial? Furthermore, while a creditor generally
must protect a buyer by bond, what dollars-and-cents protection

would a creditor have if repossessed goods are permitted to be
returned to a defaulting debtor upon the debtor's preliminary
demonstration of a prima facie defense on the merits?
Perhaps the ultimate solution will be some compromise for-

mula by which a judge would be given the authority to evaluate
whatever pleadings or affidavits are forthcoming and to fashion
such remedy in each case as would fairly protect both parties, at
the same time taking account of the particular rights and equities
presented.10 6 For the present, such procedures must await imaginative legislation on the part of the states' 0 7 and further consider-

ation of the problem by the United States Supreme Court.
Gary A. Ehrlich
concerning the merchandise. See I D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 4-12 (1970). While
not all of these complaints are legitimate, one commentator has concluded "that there is a
significant percentage of cases where the debtor has a good defense and the creditor has no
legal right to repossess." Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Processfor the Consumer;
What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 7, 15 (1972).
104 See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 157-58 (1963).
• See Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the Constitution,
59 VA. L. REv. 355, 408 (1973). Compare Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), in which
the Court upheld a procedure whereby litigable issues at a forcible entry and detainer
hearing were limited to the tenant's default, and defenses based on the landlord's breach of
duty to maintain the premises were precluded, since the covenants were independent
according to the substantive law of the state. Id. at 68-69. Cf. Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S.
170 (1923); Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
10' Other such schemes have been suggested. See Clark, supra note 101, at 335-42; Clark
& Landers, supra note 105, at 408-09; Neth, supra note 103, at 38-48; Note, supra note 80, at
62-69.
107 It was stated in Fuentes that
[t]he nature and form of such . . . hearings . . . are legitimately open to many
potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation-not adjudication.
407 U.S. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).

